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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal requires us to decide whether judges of 
courts of limited jurisdiction, such as the New Jersey 
municipal courts, are afforded absolute immunity for their 
judicial acts. We hold that they are, as do all of the circuit 
courts which have decided the issue. We further hold that 
the Municipal Court Judge's actions which prompted this 
case were taken in a judicial capacity in a case over which 




The facts underlying this appeal are brief, uncomplicated, 
and not in dispute. On July 8, 1996, plaintiff Robert David 
Figueroa ("Figueroa") appeared before the defendant, the 
Honorable Audrey P. Blackburn, J.M.C., a municipal court 
judge in Trenton Municipal Court, Mercer County, New 
Jersey, for what was to have been his arraignment on two 
counts of harassment, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a, 
petty disorderly persons offenses.1 Figueroa was charged 
with the offenses after having sent a harassing letter and 
documents to two New Jersey Superior Court judges who 




1. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a, it is a petty disorderly persons offense if 
any 
 
person, "with purpose to harass another, . . . [m]akes, or causes to be 
made, a communication or communications anonymously or at 
extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any 
other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm." Id. 
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At the outset, Figueroa told Judge Blackburn that he was 
there not to enter a plea but to challenge the jurisdiction of 
the Municipal Court over the offenses with which he was 
charged. Before he could begin his argument, however, 
Judge Blackburn directed him -- and directed him three 
times -- to turn off his tape recorder. Figueroa did not do 
so. As a result, Judge Blackburn ordered that Figueroa be 
arrested and removed from the courtroom. The entire 
proceeding began and ended in a matter of minutes. 2 
 
In an order entered following Figueroa's arrest, Judge 
Blackburn held him in contempt of court, and sentenced 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The proceeding was recorded: 
 
UNKNOWN- 
SPEAKER: Robert Figueroa? 
THE COURT: Robert Figueroa? 
MR. FIGUEROA: There is a Robert David Figueroa. However -- 
       there's a Robert David Figueroa, however, I'm not 
       here entering a plea. I'm her to challenge 
       jurisdiction -- 
THE COURT: Sir, would you come forward, please? 
MR. FIGUEROA: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And turn off the tape recorder. 
MR. FIGUEROA: Excuse me, Judge -- 
THE COURT: Turn off the tape recorder. 
MR. FIGUEROA: Excuse me, Judge. I'd like to start it -- and 
       basically -- 
THE COURT: Excuse me, sir. Turn off the tape recorder, and -- 
       and come forward. 
MR. FIGUEROA: Excuse me, Judge -- 
THE COURT: Officer, just arrest that man, please. 
MR. FIGUEROA: -- first of all, it's a county jurisdiction. 
THE COURT: Officer -- 
MR. FIGUEROA: I have papers here. 
THE COURT: Officer, would you just arrest him, please? 
OFFICER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. FIGUEROA: Excuse me, Judge? I'm challenging-- I'm 
       challenging jurisdiction of the Court -- pardon? 
UNKNOWN- 
SPEAKER: Follow him. 
THE COURT: Just follow the officer, please. 
 
App. at 34-36. 
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him to be imprisoned for thirty days at the Mercer County 
Corrections Center. She reasoned that 
 
       Mr. Figueroa refused to come forward to be arraigned 
       on the charges which had been brought against him on 
       April 12, 1996. He refused to be quiet. He was loud 
       and disruptive and refused to comply with the orders 
       of the court. 
 
App. at 37. Although mandated to stay execution of 
sentence by New Jersey Court Rule 1:10-1 ("Execution of 
sentence shall be stayed for five days following imposition 
and, if an appeal is taken, during the pendency of the 
appeal, provided, however, that the judge may require bail 
if reasonably necessary to assure the contemnor's 
appearance."), Judge Blackburn did not do so. Nor did 
Judge Blackburn set bail.3 
 
Figueroa, from jail and with the assistance of counsel, 
twice attempted to have Judge Blackburn stay the balance 
of his sentence. Both times, however, his attempts were 
rebuffed. The second and last attempt came on July 19, 
1996, when Figueroa again appeared before Judge 
Blackburn for the previously aborted arraignment on the 
harassment charges. In response to his request, Judge 
Blackburn simply noted that the issue would be resolved by 
the Superior Court. 
 
Figueroa filed an appeal to the Superior Court for a de 
novo review of his conviction and sentence for contempt. On 
July 22, 1996, after having served fifteen days of a thirty 
day sentence, he was granted a stay pending appeal and 
released on bail. Ultimately, his contempt conviction was 
reversed. 
 
On August 14, 1996, while his appeal was pending, 
Figueroa appeared before a different municipal court judge, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. By failing to follow the requirements of N.J. Ct. R. 1:10-1, Judge 
Blackburn hampered Figueroa's ability to seek the immediate appellate 
review intended by the rule. See App. at 178 (Report of the 
Subcommittee on Summary Contempt) (stating that the automatic stay 
requirement was proposed because "ordinarily litigants and others in the 
courtroom should not be peremptorily jailed prior to an opportunity for 
appellate review"). 
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the Honorable Samuel Sachs, for trial on the harassment 
charges. Before trial began, however, Judge Sachs 
discussed a directive promulgated by the Honorable Robert 
N. Wilentz, the late-Chief Justice of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court (the "Wilentz directive"), which provided for 
the transfer of any case involving a complaint against or on 
behalf of a judge or a member of his or her immediate 
family or any case in which a judge was to be a witness to 
the assignment judge of the county in which the case was 
docketed. Because the assignment judge of Mercer County 
was an alleged victim of Figueroa's harassment, Judge 
Sachs did not commence the trial but, rather, referred the 
case to the Superior Court in Mercer County so that it 
could be reassigned to an acting assignment judge or 
transferred to a different county. The harassment charges 
were subsequently dismissed. 
 
Figueroa filed this action on July 29, 1998 in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey. In the 
one-count complaint, in which Judge Blackburn is named 
as the sole defendant, Figueroa seeks damages for the 
deprivation of his constitutional rights under the First, 
Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, and Article I, paragraphs Sixth, 
Seventh, Tenth, and Twelfth of the New Jersey State 
Constitution. The complaint alleges that Figueroa's arrest 
for contempt was contrary to the statutes and rules by 
which Judge Blackburn was bound and that at no time did 
she have jurisdiction to do what she did. 
 
Judge Blackburn moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that she was entitled to judicial immunity. With the 
consent of the parties, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 636(c) 
and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the motion was adjudicated by 
Magistrate Judge Freda L. Wolfson. 
 
On March 10, 1999, in a comprehensive opinion, the 
Magistrate Judge granted the motion for summary 
judgment. See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 39 F.Supp.2d 479, 
483 (D.N.J. 1999). She found, first, "that Judge 
Blackburn's order for Mr. Figueroa's immediate arrest and 
her subsequent contempt order which sentenced [him] to 
thirty days in prison were indeed judicial acts." Id. at 486. 
Next, she determined that although Judge Blackburn was 
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a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction, overwhelming 
authority supported a finding that she was entitled to 
judicial immunity. She determined, as well, that Judge 
Blackburn did not act in the clear absence of jurisdiction 
and rejected Figueroa's argument that the Wilentz directive 
had divested her of jurisdiction. Although a copy of the 
directive had not been produced, the Magistrate Judge 
assumed for purposes of decision that the directive existed 
and found: 
 
       [E]ven if the New Jersey Supreme Court prevented 
       Judge Blackburn from hearing the merits of the two 
       harassment charges, she retained the inherent 
       authority both over her docket and the persons 
       appearing before her to ultimately decide the 
       jurisdiction issue raised by plaintiff. 
 
Id. at 492. Finally, she found that although the contempt 
citation was procedurally deficient, "the issue is not before 
this Court because the existence of procedural errors plays 
absolutely no part in the judicial immunity analysis." Id. at 
493, 495 (noting that "the public policy favoring the judicial 
immunity doctrine outweighs any consideration given to the 
fact that a judge's errors caused the deprivation of an 
individual's basic due process rights").4 
 
Figueroa filed a timely notice of appeal. We have 




We review a grant of summary judgment de novo , viewing 
all facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Arnold M. 
Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 521 
(3d Cir. 1999). A motion for summary judgment should 
only be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Our 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The Magistrate Judge also noted that "this Court is not the correct 
forum in which [Figueroa can] obtain relief," and suggested that "the 
appropriate avenue is to proceed against defendant before the Advisory 
Committee on Judicial Conduct." Figueroa, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 495 n.10. 
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task is to determine whether the moving party -- here, 
Judge Blackburn -- has shown " `that there exists no 
genuine issue of material fact that would permit a 
reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party.' " 
International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. 
Implement Workers of America v. Skinner Engine Co. , 188 
F.3d 130, 137 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Miller v. Indiana 
Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1988)). We also review de 
novo the Magistrate Judge's determination that Judge 
Blackburn, as a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction, 
could be accorded judicial immunity, a purely legal 
question. See Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
Figueroa asserts, first, that municipal court judges are 
not entitled to judicial immunity. Judicial immunity, the 
argument goes, is exclusive to judges of superior or general 
jurisdiction and judges of limited or inferior jurisdiction, if 
they are protected at all, are protected only when acting 
within their jurisdiction. 
 
Even if municipal court judges can receive the protection 
of judicial immunity, Figueroa continues, Judge Blackburn 
was not entitled to immunity because she acted in the 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction over the offenses with 
which he was charged. Figueroa invokes, first, the Wilentz 
directive and asserts, second, that N.J. Ct. R. 1:10-1, as 
amended in 1994, eliminated a municipal court's power to 
immediately execute a sentence for contempt of court.5 
Thus, he submits, Judge Blackburn did not have 
jurisdiction to order his immediate arrest without granting 
a five-day stay of sentence and her act in so doing was, 
therefore, a nonjudicial act.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It should be noted that N.J. Ct. R. 1:10-1 is not limited to municipal 
court judges. Pursuant to the rule, all state judges must stay execution 
of a contempt sentence. 
 
6. Figueroa also submits that judicial immunity was not appropriate 
because, as a result of Judge Blackburn's actions, appellate review could 
be neither meaningful nor effective. In this connection, he argues that 
Judge Blackburn's failure to comply with N.J. Ct. R. 1:10-1 deprived him 
of his liberty without the ability to appeal -- an error that could not be 
subsequently corrected on appeal. For the same reasons that we reject 
Figueroa's other contentions, we reject this one and will not discuss it 
further. 
 





It is a well-settled principle of law that judges are 
generally "immune from a suit for money damages." Mireles 
v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam); see also Randall 
v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868) ("This doctrine 
is as old as the law, and its maintenance is essential to the 
impartial administration of justice."). The doctrine of 
judicial immunity is founded upon the premise that a 
judge, in performing his or her judicial duties, should be 
free to act upon his or her convictions without threat of suit 
for damages. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 
347 (1872). The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
 
       "judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are 
       not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even 
       when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and 
       are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." 
 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (quoting 
Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351). As a result, a judge's 
immunity from civil liability "is overcome in only two sets of 
circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability 
for nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's 
judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for 
actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete 
absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12 
(citations omitted). 
 
While recognizing these principles, Figueroa contends 
that judges of courts of limited jurisdiction, as municipal 
court judges surely are, are not entitled to judicial immunity.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. There is no dispute that Judge Blackburn, as a municipal court judge, 
is a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction. Municipal courts in New 
Jersey are statutorily created pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:12-1. Their limited 
jurisdiction is set forth at N.J.S.A. 2B:12-17: 
 
       A municipal court has jurisdiction over the following cases within 
       the territorial jurisdiction of the court: 
 
       a. Violation of county or municipal ordinances; 
 
       b. Violation of the motor vehicle and traffic la ws; 
 
       c. Disorderly persons offenses, petty disorderly p ersons offenses 
and 
       other non-indictable offenses except where exclusive jurisdiction 
is 
 
       given to the Superior Court; 
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In support of this contention, Figueroa relies on the 
following excerpt from Bradley, which echoed the Court's 
earlier pronouncement in Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 535- 
36: 
 
       it was a general principle, applicable to all judicial 
       officers, that they were not liable to a civil action for 
       any judicial act done by them within their jurisdiction; 
       that with reference to judges of limited and inferior 
       authority it had been held that they were protected only 
       when they acted within their jurisdiction; that if this 
       were the case with respect to them, no such limitation 
       existed with respect to judges of superior or general 
       authority; that they were not liable in civil actions for 
       their judicial acts, even when such acts were in excess 
       of their jurisdiction. 
 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351 (emphasis added). 
 
Notwithstanding this language, we decline Figueroa's 
invitation to distinguish between judges of limited 
jurisdiction and those of general jurisdiction for purposes of 
judicial immunity based on dicta in cases decided well over 
one hundred years ago. See King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 
966 (6th Cir.) ("[A]ny statements made by the Supreme 
Court about judges of courts having only limited or inferior 
jurisdiction were dicta."), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 971 (1985); 
see also Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.) 
(opining that the Supreme Court's pronouncements on 
immunity for judges of courts of inferior or limited 
jurisdiction have been "circumspect"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
900 (1980). The concept that judges exercising limited 
jurisdiction are protected only when acting within their 
jurisdiction has never been adopted by the Supreme Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       d. Violations of the fish and game laws; 
 
       e. Proceedings to collect a penalty where jurisdic tion is granted 
by 
       statute; 
 
       f. Violations of laws regulating boating; and 
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and was merely assumed in cases in which the issue was 
not pertinent to the disposition. See, e.g., Randall, 74 U.S. 
(7 Wall.) at 535-36 (addressing the immunity of a judge of 
the "Superior Court of Massachusetts . . . a court of general 
jurisdiction"); see also Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 
143, 1435 (10th Cir. 1986)(suggesting that judges of courts 
of limited jurisdiction are not immune when acting in 
excess of jurisdiction); McClain v. Brown, 587 F.2d 389, 
390 (8th Cir. 1978) (same). Moreover, we do not believe that 
fleeting references made long ago are indicative of how the 
Supreme Court would view the issue today. 
 
Cases of more recent vintage support our conclusion 
that, for purposes of judicial immunity, there should not be 
a distinction between judges of courts of limited and 
general jurisdiction. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 
513 (1978) (according judicial immunity to hearing officers 
performing adjudicatory functions within a federal 
administrative agency); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553- 
55 (1967) (according judicial immunity to a local municipal 
police justice, concluding that "this settled principle of law" 
was not abolished by 42 U.S.C. S 1983). In Butz, for 
example, the Court found "that adjudication within a 
federal administrative agency shares enough of the 
characteristics of the judicial process that those who 
participate in such adjudication should also be immune 
from suits for damages." 438 U.S. at 512-13 (noting that 
"[t]he conflicts which federal hearing examiners seek to 
resolve are every bit as fractious as those which come to 
the court" and "[m]oreover, federal administrative law 
requires that agency adjudication contain many of the same 
safeguards as are available in the judicial process."). The 
Court also premised its conclusion that immunity was 
appropriate on the fact that the role of a federal hearing 
officer or an administrative law judge is " `functionally 
comparable' to that of a judge." Id. at 513. 
 
It is clear that the role of a judge of a court of limited 
jurisdiction is "functionally comparable" to that of a judge 
of a court of general jurisdiction. Furthermore, courts of 
limited jurisdiction and courts of general jurisdiction are 
similar in many respects. In New Jersey, for example, 
municipal court proceedings are subject to de novo review 
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by the Superior Court and the traditional avenues of 
appellate review are thereafter available. See  N.J. Ct. RR. 
3:23, 3:24, and 7:13-1. We simply do not believe that the 
Supreme Court would find judicial immunity appropriate 
for executive branch officers exercising duties"functionally 
comparable" to that of a judge, Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, yet 
find it inappropriate for state judicial officers, albeit judicial 
officers of limited powers. See Turner, 611 F.2d at 96 
(noting that "[i]f there exist anywhere adjudicative 
functionaries of specialized and limited powers, surely it is 
these officers of the executive branch"). 
 
Moreover, we find persuasive the fact that all of our sister 
circuit courts which have been presented with the issue of 
whether the doctrine of judicial immunity can be applied to 
judges of courts of limited jurisdiction have concluded that 
it can and, in so concluding, have not distinguished 
between judges of courts of limited jurisdiction and courts 
of general jurisdiction. See King, 766 F.2d at 968 (6th Cir.) 
("[W]here a judge of a court of limited jurisdiction engages 
in judicial acts in deciding a case over which the court has 
subject matter jurisdiction, he is absolutely immune from 
suits for damages even if he exceeds his authority or his 
jurisdiction."); Turner, 611 F.2d at 97 (5th Cir.) (holding 
that justice of the peace "is entitled to the same immunity 
. . . he would be accorded were he the magistrate of a 
superior court"); see also Cok v. Cosentino , 876 F.2d 1, 2 
(1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam)(holding that a family court 
justice is without question "protected by absolute immunity 
from civil liability for any normal and routine judicial act"); 
Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(applying judicial immunity to bar plaintiff 's claims against 
state magistrate judges); Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 
942, 945 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (per curiam) (according 
judicial immunity to state juvenile court judge), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 983 (1986); O'Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 
642 F.2d 367, 369 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that 
municipal court judge was entitled to judicial immunity 
despite the fact that he acted in excess of jurisdiction); 
Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1234 (7th Cir.) 
(according judicial immunity to state associate judge), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1028 (1980).8 We, too, have previously 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Illinois associate judges are permitted to"hear misdemeanor cases but 
not felony cases without special designation." Lopez, 620 F.2d at 1234 
n.5. 
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 upheld, albeit without much discussion, the grant of 
judicial immunity to a state justice of the peace and did not 
question the applicability of the doctrine to him. See 
Pennebaker v. Chamber, 437 F.2d 66, 67 (3d Cir. 1971) (per 
curiam) ("We think the action against the Justice of the 
Peace was properly dismissed as legally frivolous because 
he was sued for actions connected with the discharge of his 
judicial duties and was therefore immune from such suit."). 
 
Finally, we are convinced that the policy reasons for 
according judges judicial immunity are equally as 
convincing with respect to judges exercising limited 
jurisdiction as they are with respect to those exercising 
general jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court has noted, "the 
doctrine of judicial immunity is thought to be in the best 
interests of `the proper administration of justice . . . [,for it 
allows] a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested 
in him [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without 
apprehension of personal consequences to himself.' " 
Stump, 435 U.S. at 363 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 
at 347). Irrespective of a judge's status in the hierarchy of 
the judicial system, the need for independence and for 
freedom from the threat of a suit for damages is an 
indispensable ingredient in the proper administration of 
justice. Cf. Butz, 438 U.S. at 511 ("Judges have absolute 
immunity not because of their particular location within the 





Having concluded as a matter of law that judges of courts 
of limited jurisdiction are entitled to the protection of the 
doctrine of judicial immunity, we must now determine 
whether the immunity to which Judge Blackburn was 
entitled was otherwise overcome. As we have already 
indicated, a judge's "immunity is overcome in only two sets 
of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability 
for nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's 
judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for 
actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete 
absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12 
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(citations omitted). The facts of this case persuade us that 
neither set of circumstances is present here. 
 
We address, first, Figueroa's contention that Judge 
Blackburn's order that the sentence for contempt of court 
be executed on the spot was not a judicial act because she 
was not empowered to order any such thing. Figueroa 
correctly notes that the power of a New Jersey state judge 
to order the immediate service of a sentence for contempt 
is restricted by N.J. Ct. R. 1:10-1, which states that 
"[e]xecution of sentence shall be stayed forfive days 
following imposition" to allow the defendant to appeal and 
is further stayed if an appeal is, in fact, taken. Id. That 
Judge Blackburn may have erred in immediately ordering 
Figueroa to prison, however, does not alter the judicial 
nature of the act. 
 
Factors which determine whether an act is a "judicial act" 
"relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e. , whether it is a 
function normally performed by a judge, and to the 
expectation of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the 
judge in his judicial capacity." Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. 
There can be little doubt that holding an individual in 
contempt is an act normally performed by a judge. See N.J. 
Ct. R. 1:10-1 (granting "[a] judge conducting a judicial 
proceeding . . . [the power to] adjudicate contempt 
summarily without an order to show cause"); DePiero v. City 
of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 784 (6th Cir. 1999) ("The act 
of citing and incarcerating a party for contempt of court 
where the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the 
charge is also a judicial act to which absolute immunity 
attaches."), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000); 
Homola v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding 
the same); Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 
1990) (declaring that judge's act of holding defendant in 
contempt "was clearly performing a judicial act"). 
Furthermore, because Figueroa was brought before Judge 
Blackburn for the purpose of being arraigned, he was 
before her and dealing with her in her judicial capacity. 
Ordering him to prison was a paradigm judicial act, and 
that act does not become nonjudicial because it was wrong. 
 
Neither, as the Magistrate Judge properly concluded, did 
Judge Blackburn act in the complete absence of 
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jurisdiction. See Figueroa, 39 F.Supp.2d at 495. The 
Supreme Court has instructed that in determining the 
scope of a judge's jurisdiction, that jurisdiction 
 
       must be construed broadly where the issue is the 
       immunity of the judge. A judge will not be deprived of 
       immunity because the action he took is in error, was 
       done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; 
       rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has 
       acted in the `clear absence of all jurisdiction.' 
 
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) at 351). Generally, therefore, " `where a court has 
some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient 
jurisdiction for immunity purposes.' " Barnes v. Winchell, 
105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997). There is, of course, a 
difference between an act in excess of jurisdiction and one 
in the absence of jurisdiction: 
 
       [I]f a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills 
       and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be 
       acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would 
       not be immune from liability for his action; on the 
       other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should 
       convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would 
       merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would 
       be immune. 
 
Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n.7. 
 
Pursuant to a statutory grant of authority, municipal 
courts have jurisdiction over "[d]isorderly persons offenses, 
petty disorderly persons offenses and other non-indictable 
offenses except where exclusive jurisdiction is given to the 
Superior Court." N.J.S.A. 2B:12-17. Figueroa was charged 
with two counts of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a, a petty 
disorderly person's offense. See supra note 1. Judge 
Blackburn clearly had jurisdiction over such matters. 
 
Figueroa argues, however, that even if ordering him to jail 
was a judicial act, Judge Blackburn did not have 
jurisdiction to do so because of the Wilentz directive. He is 
wrong. Judge Blackburn was presiding over a case, the 
subject matter of which fell within her jurisdiction. As a 
case properly on her docket and with the proper party 
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appearing before her, Judge Blackburn had, at a minimum, 
the power to manage the case and dispose of any issues 
relating to jurisdiction. Cf. In re Orthopedic"Bone Screw" 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Even 
if all she could or should have done was recognize that 
there was a directive requiring the case to be removed from 
the Municipal Court and transferred to the assignment 
judge of the Superior Court of the county, Judge Blackburn 
had jurisdiction to make that preliminary determination. 
Cf. id. ("[D]espite this inability of a court to decide the 
merits of a case over which it lacks jurisdiction, a court 
does have inherent authority both over its docket and over 
the persons appearing before it."). It is simply irrelevant for 
purposes of jurisdiction whether that determination was 
right or wrong. 
 
Here, of course, Judge Blackburn did not decide the 
effect of the directive, if any, on her jurisdiction and it does 
not appear that the directive was ever presented to her. It 
matters not whether that failure, if failure it be, was for 
that reason or because of Figueroa's conduct before her or 
her haste in holding him in contempt.9  What matters is that 
Judge Blackburn had jurisdiction to preside at the 
arraignment of offenses which fell within her jurisdiction. 
To find otherwise would require a judge to refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction prior to determining whether 
jurisdiction, in fact, exists. 
 
Finally, we reject Figueroa's argument that Judge 
Blackburn's failure to grant him the five-day stay required 
by N.J. Ct. R. 1:10-1, because it was in error, was an act 
taken in the absence of jurisdiction. Taken to its logical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. To be sure, Judge Blackburn's actions in this case ignored the New 
Jersey Supreme Court's protocol for exercising summary contempt 
powers. See In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51 (1990) (per curiam). The Court in 
Daniels declared: "With few exceptions, every contempt calls for an 
explanation. Thus, even in summary contempt proceedings [the 
defendant] should be informed of the charge and given an opportunity 
either to dispel any possible misunderstanding or to present any 
exculpatory facts that are not known to the court." Id. at 62. At the time 
of Figueroa's arrest, Judge Blackburn neither provided him with a 
reason for his arrest nor permitted him the opportunity to explain his 
actions. See supra note 2. 
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extreme, the argument is that whenever a judge makes an 
error of law or procedure in a matter properly before him or 
her, that judge is not entitled to judicial immunity or, 
stated somewhat differently, a judge does not have 
jurisdiction to make a mistake. That, of course, is 
preposterous. Judge Blackburn's failure to adhere to the 
requirements of N.J. Ct. R. 1:10-1 was, without question, 
as the Magistrate Judge found, an "inexplicable" procedural 
flaw. See Figueroa, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 494. It was, however, 
at most, an act taken in excess of jurisdiction, just as if a 
judge had imposed a sentence beyond the statutory limit 
or, recalling the Supreme Court's illustration in Stump, a 
judge had convicted a defendant of a nonexistent offense. 
See Tucker v. Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 936 (2d Cir.) 
(declaring that a judge's failure to follow local procedural 
rules in arraigning a defendant is an act in excess of 
jurisdiction, but such "mistakes are precisely the kind of 
`procedural errors,' albeit `grave,' that do not deprive a 
judge of subject matter jurisdiction -- or judicial 
immunity") (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 359), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 997 (1997). Because Judge Blackburn had 
jurisdiction over the matter before her, she had jurisdiction 
to err and is entitled to judicial immunity. 
 III. 
 
In sum, we hold that, with respect to the doctrine of 
judicial immunity, there is no distinction between judges of 
courts of limited jurisdiction and judges of courts of general 
jurisdiction. Moreover, Judge Blackburn's actions were 
judicial acts taken in a matter over which she had 
jurisdiction. We, therefore, will affirm. 
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